

THE

LOGIC OF LIFE,

IN REPLY TO

G. J. HOLYOAKE'S

LOGIC OF DEATH.

NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE:

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THE writer of the following is perfectly conscious of its many defects. To some friends for suggestions and to one for an interesting communication, he makes this public acknowledgment.

In order to define distinctly the nature of the responsibility for the sentiments advocated in it, his name is subscribed below.

As a member of the industrious Classes, he acknowledges that he would feel it to be a pleasure, if on examination it should not be found discreditable to the order.

J. HARRISON.

Newcastle, June 8th, 1850.

LOGIC OF LIFE.

The occasion of the writing of the *Logic of Death* is thus represented by the author. During the late visitation of the cholera, being apprehensive that in case he should not survive it, some horrid accounts of remorse and recantation in his last moments might be circulated *by the clergy*, he determined to exhibit whilst in health, his most mature convictions on the subject of religion.

That it is perfectly right to guard against misrepresentation, will be at once admitted; though I cannot see how an article written and published whilst Mr. Holyoake is alive and well, can be justly regarded as indicating what may be his dying sentiment. *That*, the event alone can ascertain.

Yet, apart from all considerations of its origin, the article manifests attributes of a character very different from many of that school. There is an apparent solidity in some of its processes, and from its nature, and from the manner in which it comes before us it possesses some claims to particular attention.

Mr. Holyoake as a sceptic, is serious, earnest, and sad. A change has come over the spirit of the system. The scepticism of Byron, Shelley, and Holyoake, is widely different from that of Voltaire and the early French school, or even of Hume. Gay and frolicsome as the fawn, it entered the world laughing. It luxuriated in its stores, nor feared their premature expenditure and exhaustion. And now it stands before us as a "used up" libertine. Its vitality is exhausted. Wit and humour, formerly to them a source of pleasantness and joy, is now used almost exclusively as a weapon of offence. No man can read the mental revelations of the trio above mentioned, nor those of the article we

are now referring to, without perceiving that whether right or wrong in their opinion, they certainly belong to the 'unfortunate' of mankind. Who can look without a feeling of awe and sorrow into that long avenue of gloom and doubt and error, in which the soul of Shelley wandered and was lost? Mr. Holyoake manifests a cordial hatred of Christianity, and the rule of interpretation he invariably applies towards it, is (to use a phrase of his own), to put upon it the worst construction.

But it may be asked, why have I undertaken the task of examining this production? I answer that whilst public opinion naturally refers such subjects to the priesthood, there are considerations which render them not the most proper interferences in the case. They are interested parties. If the assertions of Mr. Holyoake be true, and mankind perceive their truth, then "Othello's occupation's gone" and with it the emoluments of the office.

I answer further, that the station in which I have moved has given me an opportunity of knowing by experience the sensations of the larger part of mankind, so far as these arise from the imperfections of their outward condition. Here then, my position is similar to that of Mr. Holyoake, with the exception of the diversity of the ideas on which these circumstances have been reflected.

I answer further, that like Mr. H., I have examined the subject of religion, earnestly and fearlessly. Like him, I have determined to declare the conclusions at which I have arrived, and the convictions of my mind, so far as my opportunity extends, regardless of consequences; whatever advantages I may forgo, or damage I may receive. And finally, like him (though I admit as unhesitatingly as I do my own existence, the divine character and mission of Christ, and adore his dying love,) I have arrived at the conclusion that the Christianity of this age in its prevailing constitutional forms and practices is *wrong*. Some of the matters contained in his treatise will require a very careful consideration. Some referring to states of feeling and assertions of integrity of purpose will require no comment, as I have no wish to call them in question. While there are some moral principles from which the narrow-minded sectarian, (whose religion is formalism, and the belief of certain doctrines, every practical result of which eludes his observation,) might either receive instruction or rebuke.

Mr. H. commences with some references to his own experience. "In the dark shade of this old society my lot was cast, and there I have struggled for more light for myself and my brethren. For years I toiled with thousands of others who *were never rewarded with the means of paltriest comfort, and whose lives were never enlivened with pleasure*. "Without God," says the Apostle, "without hope." How does the gloom of infidelity distort and aggravate the realities of life. The above description is utterly inapplicable to *any* who have been enlightened and purified by Christian truth

and virtue, and I strongly doubt whether it is at all applicable to the lower orders, taken as they stand, with all the imperfections of their condition, and with the average amount of virtue and intelligence they possess. For is it not evident that in connection with the imperfection of our condition, there exists a compensating principle. As the occasions of joy, so those of sorrow are weakened by time and familiarity, and nothing is more evident than the facility with which the human mind adjusts itself to the circumstances of its position, drawing even excitement, and hope, and sometimes mirth, from the incidents of adversity, and deriving from the most unpromising circumstances a higher satisfaction than others can from the most elaborate contrivances of pleasure. So true it is that the happiness of man depends far more on the complexion of the mind within, than on the character of the circumstances without. This subject brings to my mind some points in my own experience. Once when much younger than I am now, and considerably under the influence of religious ideas and feelings, I was led to take a very gloomy view of my state and prospects; nor was it altogether without some apparent reason. My means were exceedingly limited, and besides there were some sources of deep anxiety and sorrow to which I was then exposed, and known to those who were intimately acquainted with me. I surveyed the gloomy side of these things until it was exercising a powerfully formative effect on the feelings of my mind, and I was rapidly approximating to a state in which I would have arisen to move a want of confidence in the regulations of destiny. And then a new enquiry presented itself, "Are there any advantages connected with my position? and if so, what are they?" I soon discovered there were some, in fact when all were enumerated there were many. Some of my causes of regret I saw good ground for believing were actual advantages, and the most unpromising circumstances had generally a bright side on which they could be viewed, and from which hope and satisfaction could be drawn. And with regard to those above me in social position, who are often regarded with a feeling of envy and discontent by their inferiors, I considered that *they* likewise had others above them, who would occupy *in their view the same relative position* and might be regarded with the same feelings. And as there would be no end of the discontent arising from that source, I determined that with me there should be no beginning. From the operation of these ideas the whole current of my feelings were altered, and perhaps my earthly destiny changed. Hope and courage were generated, and a course of action, manual and mental—continuous yet highly varied was sustained, which most certainly was productive of improvement and happiness. From the operation of these causes a new question arose "Am I not, all things considered, the happiest of men?" And I do not doubt but that with the smallest

means of material enjoyment, I was at that time among the most happy of the race. Yet were my views defective, and in the main too selfish. I knew not then what I know now that happiness depends not so much on the good we receive as on what we communicate. In the expansion of the soul by the abnegation of personal and selfish desires, a pure and perennial felicity is alone attainable.

"The gates of heaven are considered open to those only who believe as the priest believes." If so then they are closed to me. For I do not believe in the priest. I regard him as an exotic—as an excrescence that has grown upon the Christian system, marring its beauty, exhausting its vitality, and destroying its liberty. If this is to decide the case, then my doom is sealed, and my portion will be with Holyoake and the unbelievers.

"To me it is an axiom that there is nothing higher than morality; therefore what I find in the Bible below morality, (and I find much,) I reject. What I find above it, I suspect. What I find coincident with morality, whether in the old Testament or the new, I retain."

To the first of these statements, that there is nothing higher than morality, I agree, "For now abideth faith, hope, and charity, these three, but the *greatest* of these is charity." To the others, in the absence of specified examples, I cannot reply.

We next arrive at his leading objections to the Christian system. The Fall, Atonement, Sin of Unbelief, Future Punishment.

✱ The first: the fall of man is thus exhibited. "If man fell in the garden of Eden, who placed him there? it is said God. Who placed the temptation there? it is said God. Who gave him an imperfect nature? it is said God. If a parent placed a child near a fire in which he knew it would be burnt to death, or near a well in which he knew he would fall and be drowned, would any power of custom prevent our giving utterance to the indignation of the heart? And can we pretend to believe that God has so acted, and at the same time be able to *trust* him? If God has so acted, he may so act again. This creed can afford no consolation in death. If he who disbelieves this dogma fears to die, he who believes it should fear death more."

After this strong appeal to the feelings, wherein does the real ground of accusation consist? The real causes of complaint here are, 1st: the existence of a test that might prove an occasion of falling, and 2nd: that the Divine being had not so arranged circumstances, or had not directly interfered to prevent his fall. In other words that he had not necessitated the continuous integrity and felicity of man. The solution of these difficulties is surrounded on all sides by great questions. Human liberty, accountability, sincerity, virtue. How *could* man be free, accountable, or really sincere and virtuous, if his actions were necessitated, or entirely

regulated by Divine interference. Suppose Mr. Holyoake has a friend who has stood by him in adversity, shielded him from calumny, and sought his advantage and happiness in every possible way. Suppose while gratefully reflecting on the many acts of kindness he has received, he discovers that there has existed beneath the whole a mainspring of necessity, and that he had only done *what he could not possibly have avoided doing*. Would not this consideration prove a damper on his growing admiration of the virtue of his friend.

But let us alter the case. Let us suppose that he was under no necessity to act as he had done; and that he was at perfect liberty to act in a contrary manner; and that the most powerful allurements had been exerted, and exerted in vain to induce him to do so. How differently would he regard the conduct of his friend in the latter from what he could have done in the former case.

Here we recognise the nature and foundation of morality, sincerity, and virtue. And besides if it was incumbent on the Divine being to have prevented the commission of the *first* transgression, either by direct interference or by other means, then it was equally incumbent on him to have prevented the commission of the second, and of every succeeding act of transgression. In other words man's moral nature must have been destroyed, and real virtue and sincere obedience have become an impossibility among mankind. In conclusion he tells us that this creed, (the doctrine of the fall) can afford no consolation in death. I answer that I never heard of a Christian who based his hopes upon *it* either in life or death.*

His second objection he thus introduces, "Salvation it is said is offered to the fallen. But man is not fallen except on the hypothesis just considered. And before man can be accepted by God, he must, according to Christians, own himself a degraded sinner. But man is not degraded by the misfortune of Adam. No man can be degraded by the action of another. Dishonor can only come by his own hands. Man therefore needs not this salvation. And if he needed it he could not accept it. Debarred from purchasing it himself he must accept it as an act of grace. But can it be required of us to go even to heaven on sufferance. We

* If it be urged against the view here taken, that the real point of objection is, not that his continued virtue and happiness were not necessitated but that *his fall was*. I answer that his fall was no more necessitated than was his continued virtue and happiness. The fact that he did fall is no proof that his fall was necessitated. As in the one case his continued obedience would have required no virtue, so in the other his defection would have involved no crime. As to the insinuation that a temptation was placed before him in order to secure his fall, it is an entirely misrepresented view of the case; a baseless assumption and utterly unworthy of any further notice.

despise the poet who is sycophant to a patron. We despise the citizen who crawls before a throne, and shall God be said to have less love of self-respect than man. He who will consent to be saved after this fashion hath most needs to fear that he shall perish, for he seems to deserve it."

If the above paragraph is to be considered as referring to the atonement, then nothing can be more vague and undefined than the reference: nor can any analysis determine the view the writer may have entertained on this subject. "Salvation is offered to the fallen, but man is not fallen except on the hypothesis just considered." I answer he is fallen on your own hypothesis. The darkest view of his condition I have ever seen has been drawn by yourself, and others of your party. You have exhibited a picture of gloom, doubt, mental desolation, and wretchedness (drawn in some instances undoubtedly from experience) to which I have elsewhere seen no parallel. If you are not fallen you must have had a base original. And besides you convey the impression that the christian hypothesis is *the only one* that represents man as a fallen being, when in point of fact the same idea has been held by almost every other religion that has prevailed in the earth, either in ancient or modern times. "Before man can be accepted by God he must acknowledge himself a degraded sinner." I certainly think the innocent man ought not to acknowledge guilt, but nothing can be more rational and appropriate than the acknowledgment and repentance of the sinner. You say "no man can be degraded by the act of another," I answer many have been so, our destinies sometimes are strangely intermingled. But I willingly admit that no man will be doomed to future punishment on account of the acts of another. Here your argument entirely proceeds on the supposition that we are condemned entirely on account of Adam's sin, and our own personal offences are altogether excluded from the view. In not one single instance that I have seen have you either truly or fairly represented the principles of Christianity.

You object to being saved by grace, considering it somewhat mean and dishonorable; and intimate that if you cannot go to heaven on independent principles you will not go at all. I cannot see any force in the argument, nor how any necessary degradation is incurred by our receiving anything freely or gratuitously: nor can I see how a child would be degraded by asking of its parent the supply of its want. If a man of vast wealth presented to you an estate which you had no means whatever of purchasing, you would not necessarily be degraded by receiving it: though I can readily understand how you would be degraded, if after receiving such a gift, you took the first opportunity of declaring yourself *independent* of the donor. And besides the future reward of Christianity is represented as inconceivable in magnitude. And leaving out of view our manifold imperfections, what is there *which you*

possess, which you can offer as an *equivalent* for such infinite blessings. As to your declining to receive these blessings on these terms, you are at perfect liberty to do so; but such a deliberate act must be considered as furnishing an unexceptionable reason why you should be excluded from all participation in their enjoyment.

Third. "Then in what way can there be a sin of unbelief. Is not the understanding the subject of evidence? A man with evidence before him can no more help seeing it or feeling its weight than a man with his eyes or ears open, can help seeing the house or tree before him, or hearing the sounds made around him. If a man disbelieves, it is because his conviction is true to his understanding. If I disbelieve a proposition it is through lack of evidence and the act is as virtuous (so far as virtue can belong to that which is inevitable) as the belief of it when the evidence is perfect. If it is meant that a man is to believe whether he sees evidence or not, it means that he is to believe certain things whether true or false, in fine that he may qualify himself for heaven by hypocrisy and lies. It is of no use that the unbeliever is told that he will be damned if he does not believe. What human frailty may do is another thing, but the judgment is clear that a man ought not to believe, nor profess to believe what seems to him to be false, although he should be damned. The believer who seeks to propitiate heaven by this deceit, ought to fear its wrath, not the unbeliever who rather throws himself on its justice."

Are we then to admit that the opinions and belief of men are necessarily dependent on evidence; and utterly uninfluenced by our honesty, sincerity, attention, or by their opposite qualities. We all admit this is what ought to be the case. But is it even the generally existing state of things? If so how does it happen that a man's opinions so very generally squint in the direction of his interests? How happens it that men who are largely interested in the existing state of things are almost all Conservatives? How happens it that the clergyman with £500 a year is generally wedded to the dogma that yields him his emolument? How happens it that the Archbishop of Canterbury is generally a '*staunch churchman*'? Is it "because *his conviction is true to understanding*"? Is it "*through lack of evidence*" that he rejects all facts and conclusions adverse to his religious position? True he may possibly claim all this, but are we not aware of the certain existance of *other considerations*. How happens it if our belief depends entirely on evidence, that the child of a Quaker is generally a Quaker—of the Methodist a Methodist—of the Churchman a Churchman.

I willingly agree that this belief upon evidence alone is *what ought to be*; but if you regard it as the necessary, actual, universal state of mankind with respect to matters of belief, (as I apprehend

you do,) then I must regard the whole statement as utterly false.

It is the *few* that believe simply on evidence, and the causes of the faith of the *many* must be sought for in other sources. Indeed there is reason to believe that the most candid and enlightened minds seldom arrive at a conclusion purely on evidence, and *without any bias whatever* arising from other sources. To do so is one of the highest acts of which man is capable, and high moral honesty as well as mental perspicacity is indispensably required to produce this great result.

Neither do I hold that a man is responsible in the eye of God for every conclusion he may form on the subject of religion. But I do hold that it is his duty to seek the truth; to prove all things, and hold fast the good alone. He must enquire sincerely, earnestly, honestly. If a man is responsible for anything, he is responsible for this. This is the most glorious exercise of human faculty. It is the manhood of man. The mass of even the religious are in their childhood, unreflecting, unenquiring, and the way to awaken them to moral life is to teach them that they are responsible, if not for forming right opinions, at least for using *every means in their power* to do so. The doctrine that man is not responsible for his opinions, is morally pernicious, since it tends to make a man indifferent what opinion he forms whether true or false, good or bad.

But the prime error of Mr. Holyoake in this matter consists in his believing what the priest believes. For they have concentrated all the wondrous results of salvation around the *act* of believing, which is invested with something like magical power, rather than around the *glorious truths* believed. On this latter view there is nothing irrational in the scriptural idea of faith, however much there may have been in the Divines with whom you may have been acquainted. There is nothing in this that is not in entire harmony with man's relation to the natural world. Here faith is likewise necessary. If you do not know and believe in the laws of nature, you cannot be expected to comply with them. You will sooner or later come athwart the course of their operation, and experience the disastrous consequences of so doing. Here then salvation is by faith, by the *knowledge of truth* and acting in accordance therewith.

Now the necessity of faith in order to man's salvation in moral matters is nothing more than an extension of the same principle. I am glad you admit the power of kindness and love. I would the whole world were awake to a just idea of its power. And this is the principle on which the Deity has proceeded in the restoration of man. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself." How? "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son that whosoever believeth in him might not perish but have everlasting life. He spared not his own son, but freely gave him up for us all." Here then we have the proof, the demonstration of the love of God, which, when fairly considered and understood,

places the divine benevolence to man, beyond the reach of doubt and controversy.

And it is the knowledge of this truth that reconciles, not God to man, but man to God. It is the perception of this glorious truth that will reconcile *you* to God, perfectly and instantaneously. And so with respect to all other moral truth in its order, position, and effects. And here it is most evident that these principles must be known and believed in order to produce their proper results. And the law that connects the knowledge and belief of these principles with their proper effects, cannot be regarded as an unreasonable and arbitrary appointment, but most clearly results from the inevitable necessities of the case. As to your remarks on blind faith—faith exercised without or against reason, it is utterly incompatible with true Christianity. It accords not with the single eye, the sincerity of mind, the devotion to truth, which forms the primary element of true religion. While the vast extent and variety of the evidence that sustains it, is such as to afford the most ample satisfaction to the sincere enquiring mind.

✱ Your next objection is connected with the subject of future punishment. And your mode of proceeding here must be regarded as vicious and irrational in the highest degree. You represent the Deity in this question as a private individual; his position as Moral Governor and Conservator of universal order, you place entirely out of view, and regard his actions as proceeding entirely from personal feeling, and to this view you rigidly limit your discussion of the subject. Now I ask is this view admissable in such a case. The Judge who passes sentence on a criminal in strict accordance with laws made to conserve the general interests of society, is seldom liable to have his proceeding construed as the result of personal feeling. He frequently declares his personal repugnance to the duty he is called upon to exercise; but the claims of violated order and law create a necessity to which all other considerations must submit. And yet, Oh! Holyoake this is the ground which you have chosen, to controvert and arraign the conduct of the supreme. You have libelled the Deity. You have foully misrepresented his proceeding. You have winged a poisoned arrow to the heart of your Eternal Parent. And let me tell you he emphatically disclaims every motive you have imputed to him, and indignantly repels the insinuation to which your mind has given birth. "As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth: turn ye from your evil ways, why will ye die, saith the Lord." He delighteth in mercy, judgment is his strange work. "Oh! Ephraim how shall I give you up?" I believe these declarations, I have perfect confidence in the being who makes them. Nor does the manifestation of his displeasure against sin shake my confidence in his sincerity, or inspire a doubt with regard to his integrity and goodness. And if the reward of virtue be incon-

✱ v. j. c. — "L. — f". d. — c. — t. h. —
 y. j. — c. — f. — x. — b. — l. — a. — t. — o. — u. — g. — d. — c. — f.
 — v. — c. — d. — c. — f. — c. — d. — c. — f. — c. — d. — c. — f. — c. — d. — c. — f.

cievably great, (a matter which you have kept out of view, though closely connected with the present subject, and indispensable to its right understanding,) if the punishment of vice be exemplary, and it will; there is still one object which *alone* is kept in view throughout, and that is the conservation thereby of the order and happiness of intelligent nature.

“The jurisprudence of earth has reformed itself, we no longer punish absolutely, we seek the reformation of the offender.” Do we really then in punishing, seek only the reformation or the good of the offender. We have not yet attained to that point, nor I do apprehend we ever will. We still *seek the good of society*; the preservation of its interests, order, and virtue.

I would remark further in reference to this foul insinuation, that the future punishment of sin arises from individual or personal feeling on the part of the Deity, that the acts to which the punishment has generally reference, are acts which have respect to others rather than himself. Our acts of neglect, cruelty and wrong, to our fellow-creatures, form the special grounds of the judicial proceedings at the last day. Read Matthew 25—34 ad. finem.

And finally, I would remark on the general issue between us, that the Christian dispensation is a scheme not fully developed.

The world is young; I mean the world of humanity. Revelation asserts it; Geology establishes the affirmation. We behold a scheme incomplete, whose final results have not yet been manifested. We behold the process in its earlier stage. We see it at a time and under circumstances, when in all cases misapprehension is easy, and a perfect understanding is generally impossible. Hence the little real value that belongs to that mode of attack which you generally practice, and on which you most rely. Hence the high importance of prophecy, not only for the confirmation of truth, but for the understanding of its true operation and results. Day follows night in the order of nature. And this long night of storm and of darkness will ere long be succeeded by a period of calm, and light, and glory. As time advances, the benevolent design becomes increasingly apparent;

I cannot go

Where universal love shines not around,
Sustaining all yon suns with all their orbs,
From seeming evil still educing good,
And better still, and better thence again,
In infinite progression.

* And there are some who think that the final issue of the whole will eventuate in a dispensation that will be all light, felicity, and glory to all intelligent nature: and though I see difficulties standing in the way of the *absolute* realization of this result, yet I firmly believe that this is the divine design, and will be the certain issue

of his operation in the sense of approximation; and the nearest possible approximation consistent with the moral possibilities of the case. High virtue implies a high responsibility. A glorious victory implies a real and arduous conflict, and a possible liability to disaster.*

There is one thing further connected with this question that awakens my surprise. You tolerate Paganism, and you even speak with enthusiasm of the characters formed under its influence. And yet strange to tell Paganism contained every one of those elements which you consider so shocking in Christianity.

Paganism had its doctrine of the fall. Its golden age. Its Pandora's box, with all manner of evil let loose upon the world through the fatal curiosity of a woman.—Its iron age. Paganism had its idea of an atonement and sacrifice, embodied in religious forms and practices that must be infinitely more repulsive to your mind than anything that is now enacted in Christianity.

Paganism had its sin of unbelief. It designated Christian recusants to its principles and authority by the same term that modern sceptics generally receive—Infidel. And in millions of instances it exacted a horrid penalty for the offence. And Paganism had, and still has its scene of future punishment. In fact Paganism stands convicted on every count of the indictment that has been brought against Christianity. What means the difference of treatment in their cases. I answer it proves beyond a doubt that either you misapprehend the subject, or that these reasons are the *ostensible*, but not the *real* causes of your rejection of the Gospel, which thus remains a mystery unexplained and unaccounted for.

Finally, I would ask what means this universal testimony of ancient and modern Religion, this consentaneous voice of all the earth to these principles? Can it be rationally regarded as arising from any other source than a primary revelation which mankind could deform and corrupt, but never could destroy.

On the question of the divine existence you think and speak decidedly. You pronounce against Theism—against Pantheism, and avow your conviction that there is no evidence of the *existence of a God*. Whatever we may think of the statement, we appreciate

* Nothing is more evident than the tendency in man towards maturity of character, either of good or evil. And the true moral maturity of man consists in such a fixed unwavering adhesion to what is true and good, that nothing can induce him to take another course. Neither life, nor death, nor principalities, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, can move him from the love of God in Christ. Yet the passage to this state lies through trial, through many mistakes, infirmities, and even sins. The fire of probation tries us till the alloy is removed, and what remains is pure, incorruptible, immortal.

the candour and honesty of the avowal. Yet why charge others with not having thought about the matter, or with having thought through others?

You believe not in God, but you believe in nature. Then what is nature? is it intelligent or unintelligent? If unintelligent, then it cannot be the cause of the appearances we see. If intelligent, then it is but another name for the Deity.

Again, there are certain considerations that decide our acceptance or rejection of whatever theories may be propounded unto us. We accept a theory that accounts for and explains all known facts in connection with it, and is not inconsistent with any of them; and we reject the theory that wants these qualifications.

I accept the Copernican theory of the Solar System, because it explains and accounts for all the facts we know, and is not inconsistent with any. I reject the theory of Tycho Brache and of the ancients generally, because it fails to explain, and cannot be reconciled to the facts.

We call attention then to the facts connected with the present subject; and begin with what we are all most familiar, the human face with its component organs. Here we have first the teeth, composed of osseous substance covered with a hard enamel, divided into molars and incisors: the latter, sharp edged, elongated beyond the former, so as to pass each other like the blades of a pair of scissors; perfectly adapted for cutting and dividing the food: the molars shorter, with broad surfaces in contact, adapted for grinding and masticating it.

Next we have the tongue and palate, endowed with a nice discriminating sensibility; stationed like a sentinel at the entrance of the system to exclude from it what might be injurious.

Next we have in the mouth the salival glands secreting in ample quantity, and in the precise situation in which it is required, a liquor indispensable in the first process of digestion.

Next, in order that the food may enter the Gullet from the mouth, it must pass over the wind-pipe; into which it would most certainly fall but for a mechanical contrivance, named the glottis, a sort of valve, which covers and overlaps the wind-pipe, closing from its position and structure whilst food is passing towards the stomach, and opening during respiration and expiration.

Next we have the nostrils, connected with the wind-pipe, which latter in connection with the mouth, lips, teeth, and tongue, is capable of producing 2000 distinct musical intonations, besides the vast variety of results connected with the articulated and verbal communication of our ideas.

Next, and in immediate proximity, stands that wonderful instrument the eye; placed in man and in every animal in the most unexceptionable position that could be chosen for the exercise of its functions; guarded from injury by the projecting eyebrows,

cheek bones, and the osseous part of the nasal structure. This is one of the highest wonders of nature; and the perfection of its reflecting and delineating power is not secured without the most delicate and curious organization. The highest improvements of the telescope have been drawn from a nice investigation of the human eye; and the structure of both in the general principle is identical.

Lastly we have the ear, whose principal feature is the hollow drum; similar in principle and structure to many human contrivances for the same purpose.

Here then we have a variety of results distinct from each other, each perfect in its kind, and just what the being required for its conservation and happiness; which might from their diversity, have been expected to have produced a somewhat unsightly structure; yet moulded and combined into the grandest form of beauty the material universe contains. Here we behold the proudest triumph of intelligence.

We have here given a specimen of the design and intelligence manifested through all nature. I shall just add another example. It will be the head of the Elephant. To have placed so bulky a structure at the end of a long neck, would have required for its support—on account of the adverse leverage—a tremendous accumulation of muscle; and its action would consequently have been heavy and awkward in the extreme. This difficulty is beautifully obviated by placing the head on a short neck, with consequently a light leverage. And the defect of position thus produced is compensated by the elongation of the proboscis; by which he reaches the ground, or the branches of trees above him, moving it in all directions with the greatest agility, and performing actions which for variety and utility, are only surpassed by that still more wonderful instrument, the human hand. Closely connected with this is the case of the house fly. Here again we have a ponderous head attached to a short neck; and consequently defective in position. On surveying this part of its structure, a naturalist considered that it should have had a trunk like the elephant. Here the conclusion of the human, had been anticipated by the Divine intelligence; for on examination, he found it provided with the same organ.*

*The Bee. That within so small a body should be contained apparatus for converting the "virtuous sweets" which it collects into one kind of nourishment for itself, another for the common brood, a third for the royal, glue for its carpentry, wax for its cells, poison for its enemies, honey for its master, with a proboscis almost as long as the body itself, microscopic in its several parts, telescopic in its mode of action, with a sting so infinitely sharp that were it magnified by the same glass which makes a needle's point seem a quarter of an inch, it would yet itself be invisible, and this, too, a hollow tube—that all

I have thus given you a few specific examples, out of millions that exist, (well knowing that general statements make but little impression on the mind.) And I would now ask Mr. Holyoke, —will you take upon yourself to *affirm*, that your Atheistical theory satisfactorily explains, and accounts for all these facts, and is not inconsistent with any of them. Or will you take upon you to *deny* that the idea of the existence of an infinite spiritual intelligence does satisfactorily explain, and account for all these facts and is not inconsistent with any of them?

The idea of his spirituality is important, inasmuch as it furnishes the reason why, while the operation is visible, the operator is unseen.

With regard to his personality, I would ask, what knowledge have we from observation and fact, of any intelligent being that is not personal? Does our experience, (the guide on which you profess so implicitly to rely,) or the experience of those who have gone before us, supply us with any such example? Can we even form an idea of such an existence? The principle of induction, established by Bacon, will settle the question speedily and decisively. I say then to the Atheist, study natural history, study anatomy, the erection, the suspension, and balancing of the human osseous structure. Study the human hand which alone contains a volume of wonders; and if your atheism still holds out, then I fear your case is one that requires the interference of the *medical* rather than the *logical* faculty.

I have before intimated that some difficulty stands in the way of determining the ground on which your scepticism rests. Perhaps the principle reason is that you think you can furnish something superior to what Christianity supplies. I doubt it. I do not believe that either your teaching or your practice is worthy of comparison with those of the man of Nazareth. Nor have I been able to recognize one good principle either in you or your party, that has not been drawn from that source. And on this point I must inform you that there are some drawbacks in your case.

Before very promiscuous assemblies you are in the habit of speaking very favorably of ancient Paganism, and of exalting it above Christianity. Have you considered its true character? its sanguinary and inhuman punishments? Its slavery and oppression of the working classes, and utter extinction of their rights and liberties? Its temples of lewdness and prostitution? Its gladiatorial combats; a system of wholesale

these varied operations and contrivances should be inclosed within half an inch length, and two grains of matter, while in the same "small room" the "large heart" of at least thirty distinct insects is contained —is surely enough to crush all thoughts of atheism and materialism. —*Quarterly Review*.

murder, carried on in the great cities to gratify the horrible appetite for excitement of the Pagan population? And its exposure of human beings to be worried by the wild beasts for the diversion of the same populace?

Now suppose a system should arise, equally objectionable in its details, what security have we that we may not find in you an advocate of its claims, or (what perhaps is still worse) one that will excuse and palliate its horrors?

Till these matters are satisfactorily explained, I must regard your position as a moral teacher to be questionable and doubtful.

But in connection with the subject it is incumbent on me to direct attention to the true moral ideal of Christianity. Infidelity is attempting to establish its dominion over the human mind by an appeal to the higher affections and sentiments. It professes to feel an interest in human suffering; and busies itself in contriving means to remove it. Nor is it enough to say, that these schemes are in general theoretical rather than practical; utopian, doubtful, or even dangerous. The fact that they are thus engaged, enables them to assume an amiable aspect, and wins, to a certain extent at least, the confidence and attention of the lower orders.

And what is Christianity doing in this critical state of affairs? What sort of power does it oppose to the formidable weapons with which it is assailed? A verbal, dry, hard, theological exhibition of abstract principles; which, if not impractical in their nature, are at least so in their general mode of exhibition. Yet they wonder at their declining influence.

We want in this case the spirit of the ancient Christianity. It had a great heart; and it differed in very many respects from the modern. Our modern system is in the main a formal one. To get up and maintain a form of worship, is practically the great object at which we aim, and on which we cheerfully expend our millions.

The great object of the the ancient Christianity was the work of benevolence. It had a strong, an irresistible affinity for human suffering, and it dealt with it in the most vigorous and decided manner. The church at Rome—anno 170—maintained 1500 orphans, widows, and other aged and helpless poor; the church at Antioch 3000. To state the whole would be to give the history of these times. They conquered the world—they could not do otherwise.

The grand desideratum in this age is the restoration of the true moral idea of Chistianity. We have lost it amid the conflict of sectarian interests and theological principles.

On this subject I subjoin the following propositions:

1. That God is infinitely blessed, and his happiness incapable of increase or diminution from any act or volition of men.
2. That God requires us to render the love and service we owe to him, to such of our fellow creatures as need our aid.

3. That God regards the love and service we render to these, as if they were done unto himself.

4. That God loves mercy more than sacrifice; works and deeds of love more than any external religious forms, or ordinances, or ceremonies whatever.

5. Where these forms and ordinances are unconnected with these holy practices, God views them not only without interest, *but with a positive and intense displeasure.*

6, *That the work of mercy, kindness and love, ought to be regarded in christian exertions, arrangements, and institutions, in proportion to the commanding position it sustains in the divine law, and in the New Testament scheme of Christianity.*

7. *That the action of love is a power omnipotent, without which religious ordinances and instructions soon become vapid, powerless, insincere, and utterly uninfluential on mankind**

That the above exhibition of the moral ideal of Christianity is in entire accordance with the sacred writings, the subjoined references will clearly prove. And that it is in entire accordance with the principle and practice of the ancient Christianity, will be at once admitted by every one competent to form a judgment on the subject.

Here we have a principle that alone will purify and restore Christianity, and exalt it to its ancient supremacy over the human heart. Here we have a kind of Logic unknown to Aristotle and the Schoolmen, or to modern exponents of the science—the *Logic of Love*, which answers all objections, refutes all arguments. And it does more; for it penetrates and commands the hidden sources from which these things proceed.

Nor would I conceal the fact that these principles have been, and still are, to me, an increasing source of equanimity and happiness.

Christianity sustains in death. This is a matter sufficiently established by fact and experience. And whence arises your anxiety on the subject of death? It never entered my mind that any one would circulate horrible stories respecting me during my last hours. ✱ Does not your proceeding betray the feeling it was intended to conceal? Fear is the child of night, the offspring of darkness; and athesim is the darkest of systems. That terror may be hatched amidst its glooms is by no means an unphilosophical idea. You seem determined however to stand it out as bravely as possible: and we see you here, like the school-boy by moonlight passing the church yard,

“Whistling aloud to keep your courage up.”

*Psalm 50—10 to 12. Matt, 25—37 to 40. Acts 9—4. Hosea 6—6. Matt. 7—7; 5—43 to 48. Isa. 1—10 to 20. Amos 5—21 to 25. Isa. 8—20. Matt. 5—17 to 19. Rev. 22—18 to 19. 1st. Cor. 8—1; 12—31; 13—1 to 13. Rom. 12—21. Matt. 5—13 to 16.

Yet notwithstanding all this, in death infidelity often gives way; and no man thinks of resorting to it for comfort at that hour. And how can it be otherwise? "To err is human." Let a man but consider that possibly *he may* have missed his way. That *he may* have missed eternal blessedness after the gift had been placed within his reach, and instead of it, incurred a liability to punishment. Let but this thought enter his mind at that hour, and he will not die in peace.

Christianity conquers death. To the Christian it is the passage to immortality; the gate of life eternal. "I am ready to be offered up and the day of my departure is at hand. I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness which the righteous judge will give me; and not to me only, but to all those that love his appearing" Your "Logic" furnishes no passage like this.

I shall conclude with an incident well known in this district and well authenticated.

On May 9, 1815, a dreadful accident took place at Heaton Main Colliery near Newcastle-upon-Tyne. The water from some old workings broke through the coal in the N.W. part of the colliery, rushed in with dreadful rapidity, and flowing naturally into the lower parts of the workings, soon cut off the means of escape, by closing the bottom of the shaft, in which the water rose to the height of nineteen, and ultimately, thirty-three fathoms. By this catastrophe seventy five persons (forty-one men and thirty-four boys) lost their lives. There was one part of the workings very much elevated. The water never rose so high as these workings by eighty or one hundred yards; and in this part some of the men and boys were employed; and to it others would doubtlessly retreat during the rising of the water. The exhaustion of the atmosphere by the influx of the water, bringing with it foul air, was no doubt the cause of death in a few days at most. Many of the men, and some of the boys, were pious, and the latter generally attended Sunday schools.

Though many months elapsed before their situation could be reached, yet we have a record of their experience and proceedings whilst enveloped in this terrific grave of earth and water. On a candle-box in the pocket of one of the boys, remembered with regret for his exemplary conduct, there was found inscribed with the point of a nail or knife, the following words.

"Fret not dear mother we were singing while we had time and praising God mother. Follow God more than ever I did."

On this occurrence I make no comment; its truth has never been questioned. The record is still in existence. It has been guarded by the mother of the deceased, and by others who have interested themselves in her welfare (including the late Leigh Richmond)

with a care proportionate to its value. You may perhaps treat it with levity. Though I do not consider that will effect the case in the slightest degree, as a matter-of-fact evidence of the power and value of Christian truth as sustaining the mind in equanimity and joy under circumstances the most appalling to human feeling.

With a sincere desire that our enquires may terminate in the attainment of truth, and of the virtue and joy to which it leads, I take leave of your production.

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